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The Critical Role of History in Scenario Thinking: Augmenting Causal Analysis within the Intuitive 
Logics Scenario Development Methodology 
 
Abstract 
The historian Eric Hobsbawm VWDWHG WKDW µ7KH VDIHVWHPSLULFDOJHQHUDOL]DWLRQ
DERXWKLVWRU\LVVWLOOWKDWQRERG\KHHGVLWVREYLRXVOHVVRQVPXFK¶Whether at a 
macroeconomic level or within individual organisations there are numerous 
examples of this, such as the economic crash of 2008, the causes of which had 
many parallels with those that caused the great depression 80 years previously. 
On the other hand however, overly-relying on the past as a guide to the future 
has its own obvious dangers ± not least that important future events may have no 
past precedent. As such, the present paper firstly provides a discussion of the 
advantages and disadvantages of using the past as a guide to the future. It then 
examines the role of history in scenario work, arguing that history should receive 
greater emphasis as part of the scenario planning process. We suggest changes 
to the standard Intuitive Logics (IL) approach to scenario planning which would 
render learning from history a more central component of the scenario process, 
in contrast to its current peripheral role. Rather than diminishing scenario 
SODQQLQJ¶VDELOLW\WRIDFLOLWDWHDFRQVLGHUDWLRQRIKRZWKHIXWXUHPD\GLIIHUIURP
the past, we show how a greater emphasis on history can enhance consideration 
of the causality of future change. An adapted IL that has more emphasis on 
historical analysis can augment VFHQDULRSODQQLQJ¶VHIIHFWLYHQHVVDVDWRROIRU
consideration of the future. 
Keywords: scenario planning; history; causation; learning 
1 Introduction 
A frequently quoted saying about history, attributed to the philosopher George Santayana, is that µWhose who 
cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it¶. Similarly, Mintzberg (2002, p76) states that µ... if you want 
the imagination to see the future, then you better have the wisdom to appreciate the past. An obsession with the 
present - with what's ¶hotµand what's ¶LQµ- may be dazzling, but all that does is blind to the reality¶. Building on 
this, Fawcett (2013) states that all of the issues and concerns we face today have µechoes and precedents¶ 
throughout history, and as an example of the failure to learn from history, cites speculation bubbles such as the 
µWXOLSRPDQLD¶bubble (1634-1637) in Holland in which bulb prices exceeded the cost of a house in Amsterdam. 
As Fawcett (2013) shows, since then there have been many similar µbubbles¶ including the South Sea Bubble 
(1716-1720), the British Railway Mania Bubble (1840s), the Stock Market crashes (1929 and 1987), the µDot-
com¶ Bubble in the 1990s, and more recently, the Mortgage Securities Bubble in 2008. In all of these cases a 
central cause of the bubble was, in essence, avarice - exaggerated expectations of future growth and price 
appreciation - leading to excessive speculative risk-taking pushing up prices until the bubbles burst.  
That bubbles continue to form and burst for the same or similar reasons over-and-over again illustrates our 
continued failure to learn from the past. We apparently have learnt nothing from history and this tendency to 
neglect the lessons of history is itself nothing new. One of the 20th FHQWXU\¶V PRVW HPLQHQW KLVWRULDQV (ULF
Hobsbawm (1999), cRPPHQWHGVRPHGHFDGHVDJRWKDWµThe safest empirical generalization about history is still 
that nobody KHHGVLWVREYLRXVOHVVRQVPXFK¶ (p54). The problem presented by history, then, is not merely one of 
remembering it, but learning from it, and the two are not the same thing. Finkelstein (2006, p153), for example, 
states that while individuals who lead organizations are heavily influenced by history, they often µheed the wrong 
lessons from history¶ (p169), and he provides examples from four GLIIHUHQWFRPSDQLHVZKLFKZHUHµconstrained 
by history and key leaders each took lessons from thaWKLVWRU\WKDWZHUHZURQJ¶ (p154). 
 
However, what this overlooks is that an equal but opposite problem to not heeding lessons from the past is to pay 
too much attention to history. ,QWKHRSHQLQJOLQHRIKLVQRYHOµ7KH*R-EHWZHHQ¶L. P. Hartley (1953) reminds us 
that µ7KHSDVWLVDIRUHLJQFRXQWU\WKLQJVDUHGRQHGLIIHUHQWO\WKHUH¶. The past cannot be considered on the same 
terms as the present and, mirroring this, the future cannot simply be considered on the same terms as the present, 
or the past. Similar mistakes are made over-and-over, and similar problems and events occur again-and-again, but 
they tend not to play out in exactly the same fashion on each occasion. There are usually subtle but important 
differences and these render it dangeroXVWREDVHRQH¶VYLHZRIWKHIXWXUHHQWLUHO\RQZKDWKDVKDSSHQHGLQWKH
past. In addition to this, things can happen that have not happened before (Taleb, 2007). A consideration of the 
future based purely on the past can blind us to this possibility. 
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2 Objective of this paper 
 
An important reason for carrying out the scenario work that is the subject of this paper, rather than simply 
employing projection-based forecasting as a means to consider the future, is exactly because we wish to 
understand how the future may be different from the past. Scenario planning, if it is to be an adequate tool for 
mitigating the uncertainty of the future, must be capable of resolving the tension between the two problems 
highlighted above: on the one hand to take sufficient account of how the present has come to be through history, 
and how future changes may be similar to those of the past; but, on the other hand, to avoid excessively drawing 
on the past to the exclusion of consideration of how the future may be different from the present and past from 
which it emerges. As such, this paper focuses on the use of history to aid causal analysis of the future. In a review 
of the literature, Wright et al. (2013) found that the three main objectives of the application of scenario methods 
are: i) Enhancing understanding: of the causal processes, connections and logical sequences underlying events ² 
thus uncovering how a future state of the world may unfold; ii) Challenging conventional thinking: to reframe 
perceptions and change the mindsets of those within organizations; and iii) Improving decision-making: to inform 
strategy development. 
 
The objective of this paper then, is firstly to provide a general discussion of the usefulness of history for 
consideration of the future. Secondly, this general discussion lays the foundations for the paper¶VVXEVHTXHQWIRFXV 
on scenario planning as a specific technique for considering the future. We set out a means for addressing the 
aforementioned tension by adapting scenario planning to take better account of how the present has come to be as 
it is, so as to allow a better, more historically-informed, consideration of how the future may differ from the 
present and past. We recognize the paradox in wishing to understand better how the past has led to the present so 
that we can better understand how the future may not simply be a continuation of the past through to the present. 
We argue, however, that it very much makes sense to look to the past to understand how future changes may be 
different from, but similar to, those which have occurred before, and that balance is required to learn sufficiently 
from the past without allowing it to dominate our view of the future. We argue for a greater emphasis on history 
as µRULHQWDWLRQ¶ (Hobsbawm, 1999) when engaging in scenario planning because, without firstly orientating 
ourselves with an examination of the present and how it has come to be, our consideration of the future becomes 
rudderless. 
 
3 The usefulness of history for consideration of the future 
3.1 The similarity between consideration of the future and examination of the past 
Nasson (2004, p 1GHILQHVKLVWRU\DVµ«WKHVWXG\RIthe past in order to understand the meaning and dynamics 
RIWKHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQFDXVHDQGHIIHFWLQWKHRYHUDOOGHYHORSPHQWRIKXPDQVRFLHWLHV¶. As reflected in this 
definition, the study of history, then, is about examining the historical forces which have shaped the past, assessing 
the multifaceted web of causes and their interactions that help explain why particular events and phenomena 
KDSSHQHGDQGZKDWHOHPHQWVRIVRFLHW\SHUVLVWGHVSLWHFKDQJH8QGHUVWDQGLQJWKHµGLIIHUHQWWLPH-scales, actors, 
pHULRGV DQG HYHQWV LQ WKHLU FRPSOH[ UHODWLRQVKLSV ZLWK HDFK RWKHU¶ DQG ZKLFK cause long-term change, is, 
according to Guldi and Armitage (2014, p31), a primary role of the study of history. Guldi and Armitage (2014) 
suggest WKDWKLVWRULDQVµOHDUQKRZWRDUJXHDERXWWKHVHFKDQJHVE\PHDQVRIQDUUDtive, how to join explanation 
with understanding, how to combine the study of the particular, the specific, and the unique with the desire to find 
patterns, structures, and regularitLHV¶ (p14). 
 
Taken together, these views emphasize that the study of history is primarily concerned with causation and that 
different interpretations of causation are argued out by historians through the use of narrative. We return to this 
point subsequently when discussing the usefulness of history in relation to scenario planning, since the latter also 
places causation, as considered through narrative, at its heart, albeit with the obvious difference that this 
consideration is forward-looking rather than historic. Furthermore, the consideration of the future, whether 
through scenario planning or any other means, bears many other similarities to the consideration of the past. 
Hobsbawm (1999), writing on the subject of the usefulness of history as a means for considering the future, notes 
that we cannot ask the past for direct answers to any questions that have not already been put to it. We can, though, 
use our imagination to read indirect answers from what has been left behind from the past, including through 
µFRXQWHUIDFWXDOKLVWRU\¶7KHVLPLODULW\KHUHOLHVLQWKHIDFWWKDW, in the same way, we cannot ask the future for 
direct answers to any questions for the obvious reason that it has not happened yet. 
 
The future is still trickier to query than the past because we cannot even base our consideration of it on what it 
has left behind. Brumbaugh (1966) states this problem as one of the changes in modalities which occurs as time 
XQIROGVVXPPLQJLWXSXVHIXOO\ZLWKWKHSKUDVHµWKHUHDUHQRSDVWSRVVLELOLWLHVDQGQRIXWXUHIDFWV¶$WOHDVWLQ
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UHODWLRQWRWKHSDVWZHFDQH[DPLQHWKHµIDFWV¶HYHQLIWKHVH facts can be interpreted in multiple possible ways 
and, reflecting this, are disputed. These facts represent the answers to the direct questions that have been put to 
history, as Hobsbawm puts it, even if the answers are vague and imprecise. Our consideration of the future does 
not even have this to go on, except in that the future, we know, emerges from the past and present and, as we have 
noted, often contains many similarities and analogies with what has come before. Nevertheless, in sum, and as 
Hobsbawm (1999, p.57) goes on to suggest, the methods set out by historians for analyzing historical causes, 
consequences and alternative outcomes that could have but did not happen - albeit based as they are, on what 
would be, but never can be, the futurologists¶ ultimate weapon of hindsight - are highly relevant to those who 
consider the future because of the similarity of the issues faced by those looking backwards and forwards. Among 
WKHVHVLPLODULWLHV+REVEDZPFLWHVWKHKLVWRULDQ¶VHPSKDVLV- not on thHµDOORWKHUWKLQJVEHLQJHTXDO¶ZKLFKLVD
feature of econometric, projection-based forecasting - but on the very things that did not remain equal so as to 
cause the particular outcome that did occur rather than a continuation of what has come before. When considering 
the future, what we are particularly concerned with is what changes could occur which may affect us. This, like 
the study of the past, requires us to focus on what may not remain equal: the factors that may change so as to 
result in a different path of development into the future WKDQZRXOGKDYHEHHQWDNHQµDOOWKLQJVEHLQJHTXDO¶. In 
this respect, the study of the past and the future are very similar. 
 
3.2 Difficulties in using the past as a guide to the future 
 
However, there are difficulties with basing a consideration of the future on the past. The first is the tendency for 
historians not so much to µdiscover¶ the past as create it, developing narratives around individuals and events they 
consider significant, cherry-picking some events and evidence at the expense of others ± or what Taleb (2007) has 
UHIHUUHGWRDVµWKHQDUUDWLYHIDOODF\¶RIGLVFLSOLQHVVXFKDVKLVWRU\. Any examination of the past inevitably involves 
making a tiny selection out of the infinity of things that have occurred and influences (causes) upon their 
occurrence (Hobsbawm, 1999, p.78). In other words, history is constructed, with the result that history can and is, 
written and interpreted in many ways. No matter how much evidence there is, there will always be room for 
different interpretations to justify different viewpoints, particularly for political reasons. Indeed, it may even be 
true to say that the greater the amount and variety of evidence, the more open the past is to alternative 
interpretations, since the more evidence there is, the more opportunity for selection to suit a particular viewpoint. 
 
An example of this is the so-FDOOHG µ$UPHQLDQ *HQRFLGH¶, which is the subject of greatly conflicting 
interpretations. According to the Armenian perspective, the Ottoman Empire rulers set out in World War I to 
systematically exterminate Armenians living in the territory constituting the present-day Republic of Turkey. The 
Armenian view of events in 1915 presents it as a genocide perpetrated by Turks in which Armenians were 
slaughtered in orchestrated killings and forced into deportation. While Turkey does not deny the loss of many 
Armenians during the First World War, its position based on archived documents, is that genocide did not take 
place, as historical records show that a greater numbers of Turks were killed in the years leading to and during the 
war. The Ottoman Empire was on the verge of collapse, fighting for survival on various fronts, and in fact, some 
nationalistic Armenian groups joined forces with the invading Russian army and fought against the Turks. 
However, challenges to the Armenian narrative, even when based on historic documents and scholarly research, 
are dismissed as propaganda. 
 
A second, related problem is that while the past is fixed and what happened cannot be changed, historians 
interpretations change over time because they are interpreting the past based on the general intellectual, moral, 
and cultural values of the society at the time in which they live - a FKDUDFWHULVWLFRIWHQUHIHUUHGWRDVµ]HLWJHLVW¶
AVWKHYDOXHVRIVRFLHW\FKDQJHWKHKLVWRULDQV¶GHSLFWLRQRIWKHSDVWFKDQJHVWRRWKXVWKHPHWULFVDQGEHQFKPDUNV
used to assess change also change (Miller, 2006). The result is a multiplicity of interpretive discourses surrounding 
historical events. History often tells us more about the time in which it is written than the time about which it is 
written. This is best encapsulated by Durant and Durant (1968, p21) who suggest µthat our knowledge of any past 
event is always incomplete, probably inaccurate, beclouded by ambivalent evidence and biased historians, and 
perhaps distorted by our own patriotic and religious partisanship ... even the historian who thinks to rise above 
partiality for his country, race, creed or class betrays his secret predilection in his choice of materials, and in the 
QXDQFHVRIKLVDGMHFWLYHV¶ 
A third and increasing problem with using history to consider the future LVWKHVFDOHRIµLQIRUPDWLRQRYHUORDG¶. 
What we are faced witK WRGD\ VXJJHVWV *RGHW  µis a veritable pollution of the imagination though an 
information glut that is unnecessary ± HYHQPLVOHDGLQJ¶ (p49). Edward Snowden for example, purportedly leaked 
as many as 200,000 classified U.S. documents to the media (Hosenball, 2013). However, the limited capacity of 
the human brain to synthesize, make sense of and reflect on the implications of the data overwhelms the abilities 
RI LQGLYLGXDOV DQG UHVHDUFK UHYHDOV WKDW µD VXUIHLW RI LQIRUPDWLRQ¶ UHVXOWV LQ FRJQLWLYH information overload, 
overburdening decision-making abilities, resulting in poor decisions (Begley, 2011). Hobsbawm (1999) notes that 
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what we are faced with today is not a shortage of primary evidence about the past, but an excess of it. It should 
be constantly borne in mind that information does not stand up as an explanation on its own; information requires 
a weaving together, or the application of a theoretical standpoint, in order to stand, and this requires interpretation. 
By itself, additional information or evidence does not necessarily result in a better explanation. More information 
does not equate to more knowledge. 
 
3.3 The value of history as a means for considering the future 
 
The aforementioned difficulties associated with using the past to consider the future all have one thing in common. 
They each emphasize the considerable interpretation required for any examination of the past to occur. What one 
sees when one looks at the past very much depends on the lens through which one is looking, how it is tinted, who 
made it and for what purpose. This renders learning from the past a tricky and effortful task requiring attention to 
evidence, but also in some instances attention to the absence of evidence and the reasons for this, carried out with 
nuance and balance and combined with insights into human nature and motivations so as to make conjectures 
about action that was and was not taken, or causes that occurred or did not occur. There is also the requirement 
for sufficient imagination to consider what could have happened but did not, as this kind of counterfactual 
viewpoint can often provide vital insights into the role and importance of specific causes. 
 
However, we argue that the aforementioned difficulties based RQKLVWRU\¶VLQWHUSUHWLYLVWLFQDWXUHDUHDFWXDOO\WKH
source of its usefulness for consideration of the future, rather than diminishing this usefulness. It is exactly because 
interpretation of the past differs according to the present in which it occurs, depending on who is doing the 
LQWHUSUHWLQJDQGLVGHSHQGHQWRQZKLFKSDUWRIWKHµHYLGHQFH¶LVSLFNHGWREHSDUWRIWKHVWRU\that history is useful 
as a means of consideration of the future, if not in terms of any claims to µWUXWK¶that historians may lay claim to 
(although few probably would). Varying interpretations, based on various selections and biases in evidence, tell 
us much about the viewpoints of those adopting them and their reasons for adopting them. The process of 
discussing and, where possible, agreeing a common understanding of the past, can tease out important insights 
into the reasons for varying expectations about the future. In sum, it is exactly because history is so open to 
interpretation that it provides a useful means to uncover different perspectives on the future. The highly 
interpretivistic nature of history enhances rather than diminishes its value to those considering the future, including 
those that employ scenario planning to do so. 
 
3.4 History as orientation and as a search for causal clues 
 
Reflecting this value, futures researchers are not necessarily averse to consideration of the past as a tool for 
thinking about the future. For example, van der Duin (2007, p11) states that µMost futures researchers do not 
oppose history as a guide to the future because they often (wrongly) see the past as a source of information and 
knowledge that can serve the future¶. He states that political leaders often turn to history to guide their decision 
making in the belief that history repeats itself, and the assumption that it is possible to learn from history. The 
most important motivation to learn from history he submits, is to avoid repeating the same mistakes that were 
made in the past. However, van der Duin (2007) contends that history is not a reliable predictor of the future and 
that, therefore, we cannot learn from it, going on to raise several points in defense of this. 
 
Firstly, given the highly interpetivistic nature of history, leading to a tendency for revisionism, the question arises 
as to which version of history repeats itself. Secondly there is a contradiction in that if history does repeat itself 
and we do in fact learn from the mistakes of the past, then there would be no further repetitions of history. Support 
for this comes from Evans (2000) who states that history has repeatedly proved to be an unreliable predictor of 
future events. This, Evans (2000) VXJJHVWVLVµ%HFDXVHKLVWRU\QHYHUUHSHDWVLWVHOIQRWKLQJLQKXPDQVRFLHW\>«@
ever happened twice under the same conditLRQVRULQH[DFWO\WKHVDPHZD\¶ (p59). Popper (1957), meanwhile, 
ZKHQVHWWLQJRXWKLVµ3RYHUW\RIKLVWRULFLVP¶DUJXPHQWsuggests that human futures are inherently unpredictable 
on the basis that how we act depends to some extent on the scientific knowledge available to us, and since we 
cannot predict future knowledge without it becoming present knowledge, we cannot predict what people will do. 
 
We contend that the mistake made by van der Duin (2007) and others sceptical about the use of history as a means 
for considering the future is to consider it useful only if future changes exactly replicate those of the past. The key 
distinction here is evident in Evans¶ aforementioned suggestion that history has repeatedly proved to be an 
unreliable predictor of future events. History, if seen as a means of predicting the future, is indeed a poor guide. 
However, predictive power is not a useful means by which to gage the usefulness of history ± not least to scenario 
planning, which is explicitly not about prediction, as we shall come to shortly. We contend that it is exactly 
EHFDXVHµQRWKLQJLQKXPDQVRFLHW\«HYHUKDSSHQHGWZLFHXQGHUWKHVDPHFRQGLWLRQVRULQH[DFWO\WKHVDPHZD\¶
(Evans 2000, p59) that consideration of the past is important for consideration of the future. Its usefulness lies in 
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using the past to orientate ourselves to the present, and to discuss how future changes may be similar to but 
different from those of the past. If the causes of significant past events and disjuncture points are disputed so much 
the better for teasing out alternative interpretations of the cause of potential future changes. Disagreements about 
past important changes are often mirrored by divergent views about significant potential future changes and what 
actions to take to create a future that is desirable. Disagreement about the past therefore contains much of use to 
consideration of the future. 
 
Consideration of the past, and in particular, significant turning points in a focal sysWHPRURUJDQLVDWLRQ¶VKLVWRU\
can provide the context and causal framework against which to compare, contrast and debate possible future 
changes. This is the orientating role of the past when it comes to consideration of the future. 
 
However, when it comes to consideration of the future, there is an even more important role for history beyond 
one of orientation to the present. History provides clues as to what types of causes prevail in particular contexts; 
and history provides for this most of all when outcomes transpire differently from what was expected. By 
considering contemporary expectations as to what would transpire, and the reasons for these expectations and 
why they turned out to be wrong, we can garner crucial clues as to the reasons for surprise outcomes which can 
help us think about the future, even though we know that the surprises of the future will inevitably differ from the 
surprises of the past. Hobsbawm (1999, p.317) drawing on the 20th century German historian Reinhard Koselleck, 
notes that the fundamental experience common to all who live through history is error and surprise. The best 
causal explanations are, Hobsbawm (1999, p.317) quotes Koselleck as noting, formed by those whose predictions 
have been proven wrong in the past because they have the greatest need to explain why something other than what 
they expected occurred. They search for the causes of their surprise, generating important insights. Herein we 
begin to see how vital history is to scenario planning, which explicitly seeks to consider the potential causes of 
surprise futures. 
 
4 Scenario planning 
 
4.1 Why is scenario planning a useful means for considering the future? 
 
The practice of scenario planning implicitly accepts that the further we look into the future, the more uncertainty 
increases as the potential sources of change across multiple dimensions grow, and therefore the longer term future 
cannot be forecasted with any degree of accuracy. In contrast to this, mechanistic, projection-based forecasting 
assumes that the long term is more predictable than the short term, since the latter is susceptible to short-term 
fluctuations which average out over the long term, rendering long-term trends less volatile and more predictable. 
The accuracy of such mechanistic, model-based approaches to the future relies on the assumption that the 
parameters dictating the relationship between the variables of which the model is comprised remain constant over 
time. However, even a very superficial knowledge of the history of empires, nations, innovations and industries 
challenges this idea and shows that the future, even over a period of just a few decades, is rarely a linear projection 
from the past. 
Consequently the only way in which we can experiment with the future is to develop scenarios, in which a range 
of plausible futures are developed which bound the range of uncertainties that appear inherent in the future. The 
value of scenarios according to Wack (1985) is that they µcan effectively organise a variety of seemingly unrelated 
economic, technological, competitive, political and societal information and translate it into a framework for 
judgment ± LQDZD\QRPRGHOFRXOGGR¶ (p146). Hobsbawm (1999, p.58) confirms this, commenting that the 
PDUJLQRIXQFHUWDLQW\DERXWWKHIXWXUHWKDWH[LVWVLQWKHSUHVHQWLVVRODUJHWKDWµZHFDQRQO\QDUURZLWWRDVHWRI
DOWHUQDWLYHVFHQDULRV¶+LVWRU\WKHQVXJJHVWVWKDWXQFHUWDLQW\FDQRQO\ be reduced not eliminated, in contrast to 
deterministic projection-based modelling which implies it can be eliminated altogether, or at least that it can be 
reduced to probabilistically-based risk, which is not at all the same thing (Knight, 1921; Shackle; 1955). Scenarios, 
then, are the historians¶ recommended approach to dealing with the uncertainty of the future. Yet, history plays 
only a very peripheral role in scenario planning as it has come to be commonly implemented. 
 
4.2 History as a theoretical underpinning for scenario planning 
 
Scenario Planning has been around for more than 50 years and during this period a multitude of techniques and 
methodologies have developed, resulting in what has been described by Martelli  DV µPHWKRGRORJLFDO
FKDRV¶. The literature reveals an abundance of different and at times contradictory definitions, characteristics, 
principles and methodological ideas about scenarios. The consequence, according to Khakee (1991)LVWKDWµfew 
techniques in futures studies have given rise to so mXFKFRQIXVLRQDVVFHQDULRV¶ (p7KLVµFRQIXVLRQ¶results 
from the fact that there is a paucity of theory underpinning the use of scenarios as a means to consider the future, 
leading Chermack (2002) to conFOXGHWKDWµthe status of theory development in the area of scenario planning is 
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GLVPDO¶ (p25). This is equally true of futures studies in general, which Miller (2006) contends, lacks a coherent 
and commonly accepted foundation when compared to other well-established academic disciplines. 
 
Godet (1990) notes that the absence of a theoretical underpinning for scenario planning is because the growth in 
popularity of scenarios has happened for practical reasons rather than theoretical ones, and as a result µtheoretical 
research and sophisticated tools have been neglected in favour of multiSOHDSSOLFDWLRQV¶ (p88). Confirmation of 
this comes, firstly, from Hodgkinson and Healy (2008, p437) who note that most of the scenario literature 
comprises µretrospective accounts of practising advocates«[and] individuals with significant vested interests in 
the phenomena of study¶; and secondly Tetlock (2005), who suggests WKDWµScenario consultants should not, of 
course, be the final judges of their own effectiveness. When pressed for proof, the consultants have thus far offered 
only anecdotes, invariably self-SURPRWLQJRQHV¶ (p191). This continues to be the case today.  
 
While there are a plethora of articles on scenarios developed around countries, regions, industries and issues, 
historically it appears that there have been few individuals engaged in research to develop scenario method. But, 
recently, academic research has started to underpin improved practice. Research by Chermack and Nimon (2008; 
2013) for example, confirm claims in the literature that the overall scenario planning process does, firstly, have 
an effect on rational decision-making styles of participants; secondly that there is preliminary evidence that it does 
support intuitive decision making and the attributes of learning organisations. In terms of the effects of scenario 
planning on organisational performance, Phelps et al (2001) indicate that from their research there is evidence that 
µVFHQDULRSODQQLQJLVDEHQHILFLDOWHFKQLTXHZKLFKFDQEHXVHGWRLPSURYHSHUIRUPDQFHDFURVVDUDQJHRILQGXVWULHV
IDFLQJFKDQJLQJ XQFHUWDLQ IXWXUHV¶. However, their findings aUH µSUHOLPLQDU\¶DV WKH\DUH based on two small 
VDPSOHVDQGµEHFDXVHRWKHUSRWHQWLDOFDXVDOHIIHFWVKDYHQRWEHHQUXOHGRXW¶S). Wright and Goodwin (2009), 
meanwhile, propose augmenting the scenario process to mitigate cognitive issues associated with the predictability 
RIXQLTXHKLJKLPSDFWHYHQWVWKURXJKDFRPELQDWLRQRI³EDFNZDUGVORJLF´DQGFULVLVPDQDJHPHQW - to enable 
µWKHFRQVWUXFWLRQRIDQH[WHQGHGDQGPRUHH[WUHPHUDQJHRIVFHQDULRV¶SThey (Goodwin and Wright, 2001) 
also advocate combining multi-attribute value modelling in the scenario process as a robust numerically-based 
means of evaluating alternative strategies, while Montibeller et al. (2006) extend this approach by proposing the  
multi-DWWULEXWH HYDOXDWLQJ RSWLRQV LQ WHUPV RI µLQWHU-VFHQDULR ULVN¶ DQG µLQWHU-VFHQDULR UREXVWQHVV¶  All this 
demonstrates that academic research and method development to underpin the achievement of Wright et al¶s 
(2013) three main objectives of scenario interventions in organizations (see section 2, earlier) is beginning but is 
not, as yet, well-established.  
 
As a consequence of the foregoing, the predominant view in the academic literature is that scenario planning is 
not yet based on a solid conceptual foundation; it does not yet have a sufficiently strong scientific basis to be 
regarded as an academic discipline. Scenario planning began not as a VFLHQFHEXWµDSUDFWLWLRQHU¶VDUW¶. Its origins 
are in the real world of management and it is more a craft than a science (van der Heijden, 1996, p113). In 
developing scenarios there is, of necessity, reliance on intuitive judgment rather than rigorous scientific models, 
given that, as we have noted HDUOLHUWKHUHDUHQRIXWXUHµIDFWV¶ZKLFKFDQEHVWXGLHG and, unlike conventional 
VFLHQWLILF UHVHDUFK IXWXUHV UHVHDUFK SUREOHPV DUH µXVXDOO\ LOO-defined, imprecisely structured and probability 
relationships are ODUJHO\XQNQRZQ¶$WKH\ 
 
We argue that by placing greater emphasis on history and using important past changes, especially those that came 
as a surprise to contemporaries, to consider possible future changes, and by fully acknowledging the interpretation 
that is required to achieve this and viewing it as a strength of the scenario process, scenario planning can overcome 
the commonplace criticism that it lacks a theoretical foundation. Such an approach would ally scenario planning 
to the more established discipline of history, would ensure that the process of scenario planning has empirical 
foundations (because it is partly based on an examination of past changes), and would mean it can be underpinned 
by philosophical approaches such as Critical Realism that recognize the interpretivistic nature of the social world, 
but also that there is an independently existing reality against which we can compare varying interpretations, 
leading to a socially-constructed viewpoint as to the orientation of the present, facilitating consideration of the 
future.  
 
5 The use of history in scenario planning 
 
While there are many different approaches to scenario construction, Postma and Liebl (2005) have shown the 
SUHGRPLQDQWDSSURDFKWREHWKDWNQRZQDVµ,QWXLWLYH/RJLFV¶,/,QOLQHZLWK5DPLUH]DQG:LONLQVRQ,/
LVRIWHQUHIHUUHGWRDVWKHµVWDQGDUG¶DSSURDFKWRVFHQDULRSODQQLQJ$VUHFHQWO\RXWOLQHGE\:ULJKWHWDO
p.634), this standard approach follows a sequence of eight stages, as summarised in Table 1. At stage 2, there is a 
GHFRPSRVLWLRQRIWKHVFHQDULRWHDPV¶SHUFHSWLRQVLQWRWKHµIRUFHV¶H[SHFWHGWRGULYHWKHXQIROGLQJRIWKHIXWXUH
Identification of these forces is initiated by asking the scenario team to consider a wide range of dimensions using 
7 
 
as a template an acronym such as PESTEL (political, economic, social, technological, environmental, and legal) 
or the more wide-ranging STIRDEEPER (society, technology, industry, resources, demographics, economics, 
environment, political, energy and religion). The driving forces, often over 200 in number in a typical scenario 
exercise, are further decomposed into pre-determined elements and uncertainties, and are then re-composed into 
FOXVWHUVRIµUHODWHG¶IRUFHVDW6WDJH 
 
    INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
History, then, is incorporated in this process in that it involves the examination of predetermined elements as well 
as uncertainties. The historical aspect is evident in that Schwartz (1991, p111) indicates that predetermined 
elements stem from: 
 
x slow changing phenomena: prime examples of this include demographics and development of 
infrastructure and resources; 
x constrained situations: the example given being that the necessity for Japan with a large population but few 
resources, to maintain a positive trade balance; 
x in the pipeline: the example here being what the teenage population of the US will be in the 1990s given 
that all of them have already been born; and 
x inevitable conclusions: the example in this case being the gridlock in the US created by the refusal of the 
population to accept higher taxes while simultaneously unwilling to forego any public benefits. 
We argue, however, that the incorporation of predetermined elements in this way does not take sufficient account 
of, and does not allow for sufficient learning from, history. While examination of driving forces which constitute 
the predetermined elements of change to some extent DOORZVIRUWKHµRULHQWDWLRQ¶previously argued as a crucial 
role for history, it does not fulfil this role adequately, nor does it fulfil the broader role of history as a means to 
identify clues as to what types of cause prevail under different circumstances. Moreover, it does not allow for 
consideration of past surprises or, in relation to these, examination of why contemporary expectations turned out 
to be wrong ± which the preceding discussion has shown to be a vital part of learning from history. In fact this 
earlier discussion higKOLJKWHGWKDWWKHXVHIXOQHVVRIKLVWRU\VWHPVRIWHQIURPLWVIRFXVRQWKHµWKLQJVGLGQRWUHPDLQ
HTXDO¶LQFRQWUDVWWRWKHµDOORWKHUWKLQJVUHPDLQLQJHTXDO¶DVVXPSWLRQZKLFKXQGHUSLQVPHFKDQLVWLFIRUHFDVWLQJ
techniques. The predetermined elements examined under IL, as described above, represent the latter rather than 
the former. They represent the causal aspects of the past, continuing through to the present and expected to 
continue into the future, that are expected to remain the same. 
 
The examination of predetermined elements as part of IL, then, does not really take advantage of the benefits to 
be derived from history as set out previously. There is some account taken of history through the consideration of 
predetermined elements, but this focuses on what remains the same over time, rather than an examination of 
historical change and the reasons for it. Under IL as currently constituted, there is little consideration as to how 
the present state came about, even though the future is influenced by the drivers of change which resulted in the 
how the present state was arrived at. Templates such as PESTEL focus on what is salient at present, providing 
little room for consideration of how things have developed over time up to the present, how one identified driving 
force may have gained in prominence over time, or how past significant changes or surprises were the result of 
particular important driving forces. It does not take account of how causal factors were wrongly interpreted by 
contemporaries at the time at which surprise outcomes occurred in the past. A great deal of potential learning from 
how previous expectations were misguided is overlooked. It stands to reason, then, that scenario planning 
conducted in this way does little to assist in overcoming the repeated failure to learn from the past that was 
highlighted in the introduction to this paper. Below, we show how a broader accounting for history can be 
incorporated into an adapted IL process. 
 
6 Incorporating historical lessons in the scenario development process 
 
How should a broader learning from the past be incorporated into the scenario development process? The answer 
LVWKDW6WDJHVDQGRIWKH,/SURFHVVUHTXLUHPXFKPRUHWKDQVLPSO\KDYLQJWKHVFHQDULRJURXSµEUDLQVWRUP¶
driving forces - including those which are predetermined - and then intuitively clustering them. This is just a 
VWDUWLQJ SRLQW LQ GHYHORSLQJ ZKDW DUH WHUPHG µILUVW JHQHUDWLRQ VFHQDULRV¶ ZKLFK SURYLGH D µbetter and clearer 
articulated understanding of what one does and does not know about the system, and indicates questions that need 
WREHUHVHDUFKHG¶ (van der Heijden, 2005, p121) - it is only the first step.  
 
Having generated a list of initial ideas regarding driving forces in Stage 2, what is subsequently required is a 
second (and possibly more) iterations of Stage 2 in which the scenario team undertake in-depth research to 
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determine what is known about the questions raised in the initial stages, what new questions need to be addressed 
and in what areas knowledge needs to be broadened out in order to understand the underlying patterns and 
structures of issues and how they have come about. This research can take a combination of forms including 
traditional desk-based literature searches and text mining, historical analysis, counterfactual analysis, Delphi 
techniques, discussions with experts in particular areas, interactions with so-FDOOHG µUHPDUNDEOH SHRSOH¶ and 
FRQYHQWLRQDOLQWHUYLHZVXVLQJWKHµVHYHQTXHVWLRQV¶DSSURDFKGHYHORSHGE\WKH,QVWLWXWHRIWKH)XWXUHDQGUHILQHd 
by Schwartz (1991) and van der Heijden (1996). 
 
6.1 Historical Analysis 
 
Based on the preceding discussion, which has shown the importance of history for consideration of the future, the 
µKLVWRULFDODQDO\VLV¶ VKRXOGLQFOXGHLQGHSWKUHVHDUFKZKLFKLGHQWLI\PDMRUWXUQLQJSRLQWVLQWKHIRFDOV\VWHP¶V
WUDMHFWRU\WRWKHSUHVHQWWKURXJKDWOHDVWWKHUHFHQWSDVWDQGSHUKDSVEH\RQG6RLIWKHIRFDOµV\VWHP¶LVDSDUWLFXODU
business which has chosen to consider its future through scenarios, the process by which the company has arrived 
in its current state should be traced through important past changes and investigations as to what caused these and 
how what occurred may have differed from what was expected to occur aWWKHWLPHDQGZK\µ&RXQWHUIDFWXDO
DQDO\VLV¶FDQEHHPSOR\HGWRFRQVLGHUWKHFRPSDQ\¶VSUHVHQWVWDWHKDGWKHH[SHFWHGRXWFRPHWUDQVSLUHGRUDQRWKHU
alternative outcome played out, thereby providing vital clues as to what types of cause may prevail in the system 
of interest. 
 
Considerably greater attention to the historical process of transformation through which the company ± or 
industry, or region, or macro economy, or whatever system is the focus ± has come to be as it is provides both an 
agreed orientation as to the present state through which to consider future transformations and an in depth analysis 
RIWKHW\SHVRIFDXVHVZKLFKKDYHSUHYDLOHGXQGHUSDUWLFXODUFLUFXPVWDQFHVLQWKHSDVW,IWKHFRPSDQ\¶VKLVWRU\
or the cause of important past transformations cannot be agreed so as to provide such a clear orientation to the 
present and clues as to past causes, in many respects, this is so much the better. This provides an opportunity to 
tease out key differences in stakeholder viewpoints with regards tKHFRPSDQ\¶VFXUUHQWVWDWHWKHQHHGIRUFKDQJH
and the reasons for potentially divergent expectations about the future. Simply bringing these out into the open 
and rendering them explicit can be a valuable contribution from engagement in a scenario exercise incorporating 
an initial in depth examination of the history of the focal system of interest. An important element of this early 
µresearch¶ZRXOGWKHUHIRUHEH to challenge the conventional wisdom ± RUVHQLRUPDQDJHPHQW¶VVWDQGDUGYLHZ± as 
to the compaQ\¶VSUHVHQWVWDWHWRquestion the supposedly reliable data on which decisions are being made, and 
WRVFUXWLQL]HWKHSUHYDLOLQJGLVFRXUVHDVWRWKHFRPSDQ\¶VEDVLFQDWXUHDVPDQLIHVWLQLWVKLVWRULFDOGHYHORSPHQW 
 
6.2 Expanding the role of research in the process 
 
In many respects, this approach, incorporating a much more detailed initial stage, is, we believe, more in keeping 
with scenario planning as it was originally intended. While there has been an exponential rise in the literature on 
scenario planning (Hodgkinson et al. 2006; Ramirez et al, 2007; Varum and Melo, 2010), in reviewing a wide 
range of scenarios the observation of van Asselt et al (2010) is that most of the accounts of the process are 
relatively short descriptions of the main steps. Consequently µchoices, considerations, discussions, struggles, 
compromises, unproductive steps, flaws, practical adjustments, experiments, difficulties, challenges and local 
VROXWLRQVDUHFRQFHDOHG¶van Asselt et al., 2010, p.11). In keeping with this, it is our contention that most of the 
accounts infer that the development process is a relatively straightforward and linear one; little attention is given 
to segregating out what is predetermined and what is uncertain, or to the role of history in understanding how the 
present situation has come about and how it may evolve in the future. Important causes of past significant changes 
and their potential to be repeated, albeit in a different context leading to subtle but important differences in the 
way they play out, are therefore overlooked. The scenario process has become, to some extent, a somewhat 
simplistic, off-the-VKHOI WRRO ZKLFK DOORZV PDQDJHPHQW WR µWLFN WKH ER[¶ LQ WHUPV RI IXWXUH SURRILQJ DQG
consideration of the future. The simplistic way in which the IL process has been documented - with the good 
intention of widening access to scenario practice and invoking discussion - may have inadvertently contributed to 
this. 
 
Therefore, in order to remedy this it is essential that in describing the scenario development process it should be 
emphasized that: 
 
x the objective of Stage 2 and 3 is ultimately to understand the causal structures of elements and how they 
have evolved over time in order to then determine the predetermined and uncertainty elements of the future; 
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x this requires µUHWURVSHFWLYHDQDO\VLVDQGWKRXJKW¶DQG historical research of a wide range of variables to 
identify and map causal links to understand the history of system behaviours and to search for cues to 
causality; 
x research in this context should take the form µLFHEHUJDQDO\VLV¶ often used in systems thinking which entails 
digger deeper to move the thinking beyond current events which represent the visible 10% of the iceberg 
above the waterline, to discerning trends, patterns and recurrence of events; but this is insufficient, it is 
necessary to go further and dig below these in order to identify and understand the underlying systemic 
structures and relationships between the parts, and then below this to the baseline, to discern the 
worldviews in terms of the assumptions, beliefs and values which create and sustain the systems; and 
x a variety of research methods discussed earlier should be used, not all of which will prove useful; to reach 
what Wack (1985, S WHUPHG WKH µ$KD¶ PRPHQW the point where there is clarity on what is 
predetermined and what is indeterminate, the scenario development process, in particular steps 2 and 3, is 
inevitably an iterative process. 
 
In view of this, the suggestion is that Stages 2 and 3 of the development process should be expanded upon as 
summarized in Table 2 which now LQFOXGHVDµUHVHDUFK¶SKDVHLQWKHSURFHVV. While the role of research in the 
scenario development process is not given much prominence in the literature, it is a critical element of the process, 
support for which comes from Mietzner and Reger SZKRLQGLFDWHWKDWµit should not be overlooked 
that a deep understanding and knowledge of the field under investigation is absolutely necessary. Data and 
information from different sources have to be collected and interpreted which makes scenario building even more 
time-FRQVXPLQJ¶. We agree that it should not be overlooked, but argue that in many instances it is being 
RYHUORRNHGDQGWKDWWKLVLVUHGXFLQJVFHQDULRSODQQLQJ¶VDELOLW\WRFRQWULEXWHWROHDUQLQJLQFOXGLQJOHDUQLQJIURP
the past. While this research stage is time consuming - van der Heijden (2005, p121) notes that µthere is no limit 
to the amount of energy than can be LQYHVWHGLQWKLVUHVHDUFKSKDVH¶ - the outcome of not devoting the time to 
undertaking the expanded tasks depicted in this table is that the scenarios developed will invariably be first 
generation scenarios. In other words, they will be somewhat basic and broad-brush and will overlook many aspects 
of the focal system under scrutiny that have proven crucial in the past and which therefore demand to be taken 
into consideration. While the initial stages of the process as currently commonly implemented may indeed uncover 
some obvious prederetermined elements, a limited research stage of this type will tend to produce an incomplete 
picture ± especially in relation to causation - and will provide few insights beyond what was already known; 
consequently the resulting scenarios will be of limited value to decision makers as they will provide no basis for 
strategic action. 
 
    INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
7 Conclusions 
 
Because the future is uncertain it will never be possible to avoid making mistakes. Nevertheless, we owe it to 
ourselves at least to make new mistakes rather than repeat old ones. This requires learning from the past. We 
began this paper by noting that failure to learn from the past is common in many walks of life, not least in relation 
to the economy in which numerous bubbles have been inflated and burst with severe consequences over hundreds, 
perhaps even thousands, of years. That this continues right up to the present is testament to our continued failure 
to learn. 
 
We have highlighted many advantages and some disadvantages to learning from the past. However, the 
disadvantages, we have contended, can be seen as advantages too. We have noted that the usefulness of the past 
for thinking about the future does not lay in predictive power, which it does not have. Rather, hLVWRU\¶VYDOXHWR
consideration of the future lies in its ability to tease out conflicting viewpoints, misunderstandings and biases 
among stakeholders. It also lies in providing an orientation to the present and how it has come to be without which 
our consideration of the future and how it may be different is rudderless. Through scenarios we wish to consider 
how the future may be different and this implies µdifference from¶ something else, and that is the present and the 
past. Without a detailed understanding and orientation to these, we cannot possibly establish a difference between 
the future and these. In other words, the past and present is at the very least needed to provide the contrast against 
which a different future is described. 
 
Beyond this orientation role for history, the past can provide valuable clues as to the types of cause which prevail 
in different settings and circumstances. Granted, future causes may differ, or the same causes may play out in a 
somewhat different way, but to simply disregard the causes that have proven important in the past for these reasons 
seems at best wasteful and at worse hubristic. In acknowledging that the future does not exactly replicate the past 
we should not throw the baby out with the bathwater, to coin a common phrase. We can learn from the past even 
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while acknowledging that it does not repeat itself in the same way every time similar events occur, and while also 
realizing that some of the most important occurrences of the future will be those which have no similar precedents 
in the past.  
 
The importance of the vital early µresearch¶ stages of the scenario planning process, in which history is examined, 
may have become diluted through commendable efforts to communicate the scenario process in a way that is 
accessible and easy to understand. The initial stages of the scenario process, we contend, should be viewed as 
those in which the greatest part of the effort is applied. The subsequent scenario building part of the process 
should, in essence, be relatively straightforward if these earlier stages have been adequately implemented. It is the 
earlier research stages, with an emphasis on orientating participants to the present and on uncovering important 
causes, which provide the context within which to think about the future and how it may differ from that present. 
We have argued that a central component of this is an in depth analysis of the past, with a particular focus on the 
evolution and development over time of the focal system of interest, whether it be a particular company, an 
industry, a local government service or a macro economy. We have suggested that the tendency for there to be 
multiple perspectives on the past renders history more useful, rather than less useful, as a means for considering 
the future %\ H[DPLQLQJ GLVFXVVLQJ DQG GHEDWLQJ SDVW FKDQJHV SDVW µVXUSULVH¶ outcomes, and why the 
expectations of contemporaries were not met in the past, we can garner vital clues that can assist us in considering 
how future changes may or may not play out, and how current expectations may fail to transpire leading to a 
surprise future. A key tension resolved through a successful, informative and useful scenario process is to balance 
learning from the past with consideration of how the future may differ from the past. We have argued that this 
requires a scenario process that places greater emphasis on learning from the past and we have outlined the 
adaptations to the currently most commonly used scenario process which can assist with this. 
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Table 1: The Intuitive Logics Standard Approach to Scenario Development 
Stage Activity 
Stage 1: Setting the scenario agenda Defining the issue of concern and process, and setting 
the scenario timescale. 
Stage 2: Determining the driving forces Eliciting a multiplicity of wide-ranging forces. 
Stage 3: Clustering the driving forces Clustering causally related driving forces, testing and 
naming the clusters. 
Stage 4 Defining the cluster outcomes Defining two extreme, but plausible and hence 
possible, outcomes for each of the clusters over the 
scenario timescale. 
Stage 5: Impact/uncertainty matrix Ranking each of the clusters to determine the critical 
uncertainties i.e. those clusters which have both the 
most impact on the issue of concern and also the 
highest degree of uncertainty as to their resolution as 
outcomes. 
Stage 6: Framing the scenarios Selecting two initial critical uncertainties to create a 
scenario matrix, framing the scenarios by defining the 
extreme outcomes of the uncertainties. 
Stage 7: Scoping the scenarios Building a broad set of descriptors for each of the four 
scenarios. 
Stage 8: Developing the scenarios Developing scenario storylines, including key events, 
WKHLUFKURQRORJLFDOVWUXFWXUHDQGWKHµZKRDQGZK\¶RI
what happens. 
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Table 2: Stage 2 Expanded 
Stage 2: Expanded Activity Questions Output 
Step 1: Initial 
brainstorming of 
driving forces.  
µ%OXH 6N\¶ WKLQNLQJ to 
elicit a multiplicity of 
wide-ranging forces. 
x What do we see going on 
around us - what have we 
seen happening recently? 
x What events and trends have 
we see happening over time? 
Initial list of driving forces. 
Step 2: Review of 
initial driving 
forces. 
Discussion and 
questioning of 
knowledge around the 
initial driving forces. 
 
x What do we know for sure 
x What do we not know and 
need to know more about? 
x What have we missed/not 
talked about? 
Research agenda. 
Step 3: Research. x Historical  analysis 
x Eliciting perspectives 
from a diverse range of 
individuals - µH[SHUWV¶
DQG µUHPDUNDEOH
SHRSOH¶ 
x Delphi techniques 
x Counterfactual analysis 
What are the underlying 
structures which determine if a 
driving force is predetermined 
or uncertain? 
x What has historically 
influenced the events and 
trends? 
x What are the historical 
relationships between the 
parts? 
x What are the factors which 
will change or keep the 
system(s) in place? 
x What are the assumptions, 
beliefs, and values at play? 
Deeper understanding of 
what is predetermined and 
why, and what is uncertain 
and why. 
Step 4: Review of 
research findings. 
Discussion and testing of 
knowledge around the 
revised driving forces. 
 
Do we understand this; do we 
need further research in any 
particular area? 
x If further research is not 
required, revise driving 
forces and proceed to 
Stage 3. 
x If further research 
required, undertake a third 
more focused research 
exercise. 
Stage 3: Clustering 
the Driving Forces. 
Clustering causally 
related driving forces, 
testing and naming the 
clusters. 
x Are the clusters coherent; are 
the causal links logical and 
plausible?  
x Do we need some further 
research to examine the 
linkages and causality? 
x If further research is not 
required, proceed to Stage 
4. 
x If further research 
required, undertake a 
fourth more focused 
research exercise. 
 
